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ABSTRACT 
 
Based on seven months of fieldwork research, the present article explores the nature and ‘reach’ 
of the state in post-genocide Rwanda, and its effects on decentralisation, participation and 
assertion of voice at the local level. Rwanda as a case of a ‘strong’ African state is explored 
through a number of lenses: the vertical structure (administrative and information apparatuses of 
the state); the lateral structure (multiple responsibilities, imihigo, indirect control); the spectrum 
of state-led ‘local’ activities; and last but not least, the ‘counterweights’ to the state. The article 
suggests an increasing penetration of state in terms of surveillance as well as exactions (couched 
in terms of umusanzu or contribution) and control over voice at local level. Decentralisation 
amounts to mere ‘dispatching of control’, making central power more, not less, effective. 
 
* The author wishes to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the article.  
 
 
ANDREA PURDEKOVÀ 
 2 
 
INTRODUCTION:  A STRONG STATE IN THE MIDST OF A STATE WEAKNESS PARADIGM 
 
‘Government of Rwanda is like MTN1 – everywhere you go.’ 
A joke passed around Kigali. 
 
Discussion of the state in sub-Saharan Africa typically refers to its empirical ‘weakness’, 
its inability to extend authority, legitimate use of force, administration and services over 
the whole territory or the whole territory equally (Herbst 1996, 2000; Jackson & Rosberg 
1982; Widner 1995). This has become a true metanarrative of stateness in Africa. The 
difficulty has been traced to the ‘non-territorial nature of power’2 (Herbst 2000: 35), 
which presented most African leaders with the fundamental problem of ‘how to broadcast 
power over sparsely settled lands’ (ibid.: 3). However, as most analysts briefly mention in 
a side note, there are exceptions to this rule. In a few places in Africa, including the Great 
Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands, ‘there are ecologies that have supported 
relatively high densities of people’, and it is these areas that ‘have been periodically able 
to exercise direct control over their peripheries’ (ibid.: 11).  
Rwanda is the most densely populated African state, and comprises a small territory 
with no sparsely populated areas. The state’s reach is extensive and governments, besides 
the issue of control of population, are pre-occupied with the issue of territory (manifested 
in the rise of an irredentist rhetoric in Rwanda). These dynamics are in stark contrast to 
the research of Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (1997, 2003) in countries such as Benin 
and the Central African Republic, where the state is rather absent in local political 
milieus, these being instead suffused by a tangle of alternative authorities. Rather than 
asking What makes states weak? and What actors take the place of state and how?, 
Rwanda as a ‘strong’ state makes us pose a different set of questions altogether: What are 
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the different apparatuses through which the central power reaches people and how 
‘thick’ are they? How do they saturate lived time and space? What, if anything, is ‘non-
state’?  
Many researchers have noted the strength and intricacy of political administration in 
Rwanda and how its reach to the lowest levels contributed to the ‘effectiveness’ and mass 
nature of the 1994 genocide (Stover & Weinstein 2004; Straus 2006; Uvin 1998). Though 
governments replace one another, this intricate organisation, while modified, has 
remained fundamentally unchanged. In what follows, I study the ‘reach’ of central power 
post-genocide through the analysis of i) the ‘administrative apparatus’; ii) the 
‘information apparatus’ that lies at its disposal; iii) the spectrum of ‘grassroots’ activities 
which it not only organises but through which it governs; and finally iv) the structural 
‘counter-weights’ to the state. This analysis is crucial if we are to understand how ‘local’ 
official activities (e.g. umuganda, gacaca, a score of unity and reconciliation activities) 
are perceived in today’s Rwanda and what can be, and is, achieved through them.  
The findings presented below draw on seven months of field-based research in 
Rwanda (between March 2008 and April 2009), combining observation (of physical 
structures, social norms, people’s responses, official activities such as umuganda or 
collective work, ingando or retreats for selected populations aiming at re-
education/transformation, ubusabane or community ‘get-together’ festivals, etc), 
immersion (‘being’ in a place, being part of unfolding dynamics), as well as formal 
interviews and informal interactions (with local level state administrators, employees of 
different ministries, RPF members, and many Rwandans outside officialdom). 
Observations of local state dynamics pertain mainly but not exclusively to different urban 
quarters of Kigali. Through travel to most parts of Rwanda and interviews, I was also 
able to gather comparative insights about the rural milieu. With some generalisation, we 
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can conclude that the dynamics observed in urban areas pertain to rural areas, except that 
in rural areas the power of the state is wielded and felt even more intensely.  
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS 
 
‘Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’ – Coordinator of an ingando camp 
 
The vertical structure: from gihugu to mudugudu 
The administrative apparatus of the Rwandan state is characterised by clear hierarchies 
and an intricate organisation leading from gihugu (country) to mudugudu (village) and, 
informally, even lower. After two recent rounds of revamping,3 the official structure has 
the following five levels: 4 intara (provinces), 30 uturere (districts), 416 imirenge 
(sectors), 2146 utugari (cells) and 14,876 imidugudu (villages). In 2006, the previously 
lowest administrative unit of the nyumba kumi – a grouping of ten households overseen 
by non-salaried representatives (comprising some 150,000 people altogether) – was 
officially replaced by the larger units of imidugudu. However, there are reports of 
nyumba kumi being active informally even after this date (USAID 2008). The intricate 
state organisation has roots that reach to the pre-colonial Nyiginya kingdom.4  
The intricate administrative web, however, does not inspire complex mapping. Rather 
than spatial representations, the primary governance tool for orientation and targeting is 
‘tracing’ through the spreading webs of people that make up the administration. The 
structure is conceptualised as a chain, with ‘cascade’ potential, and its multiplicatory 
effects capture people’s imagination. The snowball effect of this structure also means that 
directives and information in general reach large numbers at all levels fast. More than 
SURVEILLANCE AND STATE REACH IN RWANDA 
 
 
5 
control over territory (though this matters also), administrative governance emphasises 
direct and indirect control over people produced through access. Official power has to be 
‘felt’, it has to be localised and intimate, not just decreed from a faraway centre.   
Let me first approach the ‘presence’ of the state through the physical presence of 
administrative structures (offices) at the lower levels.5 The sector-level administration has 
the most physical presence and all its buildings are easily noticeable on the landscape: 
They are low red brick buildings with a sign at the entrance, a clearing of red earth in 
front, an annex of wooden benches (sometimes fitted with an orange tarpaulin roof), a 
pole with the Rwandan flag, and usually people queuing in front of the umuyobozi’s6  
office waiting for an ‘audience’. This is the space where gacaca and other important 
meetings and activities take place. Cell offices, usually comprising a single small room, 
are included in the space of the sector. In the Nyakabanda ambere7 (‘first Nyakabanda’) 
cell, papers pinned to the wall listed the constituent ‘villages’ (in cities these are really 
‘quarters’). ‘Village’ ibiro (offices) are spread across the communities themselves. They 
usually comprise a single room with a small tin sign above the door signalling its 
purpose.  
Which is the most important administrative level? All in all, and from a global 
perspective of power in a highly centralised and authoritarian state, ‘no one takes 
decisions at the lowest level… you wait for instructions’.8 But looking more closely and 
moving from top down, all decisions at the district level are taken by the mayor. At levels 
below this, decisions are taken by the sector head, rather than the Njyanama council (the 
sector assembly of all adults) as officially decreed. Meetings and imihigo goals [annual 
targets], for example, should be decided by the council ‘but it is never the case. … They 
speak of ‘council’ but it is never there’.9 In fact, the military and police seem to have 
more clout than administrative decision-makers. ‘It is the “Brigade CO” that is the 
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highest actual authority at district level – the general/colonel who is [stationed] there.’10 
When it comes to gacaca, an anthropologist studying the courts found that the police 
superintendent is more important than the inyangamugayo (gacaca judge), especially 
when it comes to backstage ‘preparing’ of witnesses.11  
While directives and power may be handed from the top down, surveillance and 
control begin at the smallest, most intimate levels, with reports and requests trickling up: 
‘All of them are important administrative levels. But at the lowest level, they know the 
people. If you don’t pay your taxes, they know. If you are a drunkard, they know. The 
policing committees [plain clothes police or ‘community police’] start there. If I want a 
passport, I go to the village authority, who says I am a good citizen, I love my 
neighbours, pay my taxes… Everything begins there, in the village. They [village leaders] 
give a paper to the cell authorities, then the sector and it ends there. But if there are 
difficult decisions, there is intervention from the district mayor.’12  
If the sector complex (which includes cell offices) is where a common person 
normally ‘encounters’ the state, officially the akarere (the district) is the main political-
administrative unit. All ‘resident citizens’ aged above 18 are members of the district 
council called Njyanama, which is responsible for ‘mobiliz[ing] residents, discuss[ing] 
and prioritiz[ing] problems and tak[ing] decisions for their resolution’.13 Njyanama is a 
‘consultative council’ (conseil consultatif) on top of which sits the executive council 
called Nyobozi. As described above, Njyanama seems to hardly take any decisions of 
importance, as all are essentially communicated from above. ‘The main decision making 
power lies with an administrator (the executive secretary) who is appointed by the central 
administration and thus not elected by the population’ (Ansoms 2009: 307).  
The trickle-down system can create a paradoxical inflexibility and confusion. Local 
administration, which is ‘close’ to the people and should theoretically be able to decide 
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fast and best manage its tasks, in fact becomes paralysed and ineffective because it waits 
for vital information to make it down the tree-like ‘plumbing’ of the state: ‘At 
umudugudu level, I am sure they [usually] don’t know until Friday midnight what to do at 
umuganda, until the decision from cell level and higher [is communicated] … The people 
don’t know what tools to bring … half the people show with machetes when we need 
hoeing to be done!’14     
The cell itself has a careful structure of its own. The coordinator of my cell, an 
abakangurambaga,15 explains that his is a ‘travail de bureau’. ‘I sign official documents, 
take care of all the politics, organise village meetings and work with the cell committee.’ 
The committee or komite is composed of ten people – the coordinator, secretary, and 
persons in charge of education, health, security, development, finance, training, women, 
and youth. The youth representative, for example, ‘organises the youth, and for the 
moment, is involved in combating ideologies that separate the youth [such as] 
regionalism, racism’. The coordinator also explains to me that the cell committee 
members ‘are elected by the population, it is not voluntary’. The only member of the cell 
who is paid is the ‘ES’ (executive secretary), the rest of the cell personnel along with all 
the village administrators are ‘volunteers’ (corroborated by Ingelaere 2010).  
 
‘Umuryango RPF’:  the parallel structures of the party 
Just as the local administrative offices are easily recognisable when you pass them in the 
countryside, so are the little satellite ‘FPR’ ibiros (RPF offices). No other party has local 
presence in rural areas. More importantly, the hierarchies of the RPF mimic those of the 
state (‘at all administrative levels the two structures are there’16), with the result that the 
lines between ruling party and state are blurred. Already in 1995, HRW (1995:15) noted 
the existence of abakada (cadres) – ‘an organized group of powerful young people … 
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political officers attached to the RPA … responsible for supervising local political life.’ 
They were ‘operat[ing] parallel to the usual legitimate authorities’ (ibid.). In 2007, the 
informal parallel institution was made public when the ban on ‘political party structures 
at the grassroots’ was lifted, and the RPF became the first and thus far the only party to 
elect officials at the umudugudu level. The elected seven-person committees then 
allegedly proceeded to elect17 cell representatives and so on all the way to the district 
level (NTK 9.7.2007). 
Besides its parallel nature, it seems ‘the party is more powerful than the state. The 
party controls the state.’18 RPF structure controls the administrative structure because, 
after all, the administrators are party members. 
 
Informant:   I lost my job in 2005 because I refused to become a party member. You cannot 
become employee of government if [you are] not party member.  
Me:              Is the same person responsible for the two aspects?  
Informant:   [Generally speaking] chairman of administration at umudugudu level is in charge of 
the RPF at umudugudu level. You find that it is almost the same people [at the two levels], go 
to cell, sector, almost the same, district, members of the district council, all members of the 
RPF … not necessarily the same people, but that is a gentle way of hiding what is really going 
on. 
Me:              What do RPF representatives at local levels do?  
Informant:   I used to be a member of my RPF umudugudu committee, recruited by force – 
‘nominated’ … The [2010] presidential election campaign has already started and those guys 
are told to make it happen. As secretary of the umudugudu level, you have to assume those 
responsibilities, strategies for voting campaign, for member recruitment, to deal with defectors 
– those who just move away from the party, [and make sure] that you know each and 
everybody.19  
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The pro-government NTK (9.7.2007) reported that ‘it is amazing but not a surprise to 
find that all residents of some areas are members of RPF’. The reason is that ‘the party 
machinery is very strong and very harsh. Here we are forced to become members of the 
ruling party… In the countryside, there is almost 99% if not 100% membership. In town 
maybe it is little lower, but not below 90%.’20 Pre-1994, with the advent of 
multipartysim, the MDR is known to have organised kubohoza (means ‘liberating’, 
literally ‘help to set free’) – dispatches of party members to a person’s home for forced, 
and often violent, recruitment (Verwimp & Pinchotti 2007:16). After the genocide, forced 
recruitment continued. Before the 2003 elections, ‘local officials or party organisers 
called people to meetings at sector offices where they were publicly pressured to join the 
RPF. In one case, approximately half the group agreed. Officials continued to ‘persuade’ 
those who refused to join … In a sector in another province, people were told that they 
should aim to make 90 percent of their neighbours into RPF supporters’ (HRW 2002: 3).  
The membership in the party is couched in the soft and encompassing language of 
‘family’. The full name of the RPF is Umuryango RPF-Inkotanyi. Umuryango has 
different shades of meaning; it can mean ‘association’, but is most often used to mean 
‘extended lineage’ or simply ‘family’. The RPF’s self-presentation using the totalist and 
exclusivist language of a ‘front’ or ‘family’ (HRW 2002; NDI 2003) shows both the 
skilful use of indirect language (an outsider might not recognise coercion in it), and the 
use of discourse surrounding family to solidify its vision of political ‘unity’ and 
‘division’. According to an RPF recruit, ‘those who taught me said that the RPF is not a 
party but rather a family and that all Rwandans should be part of [it]. Those who don’t 
join are outsiders. They are the ones who cause instability in the country. We should 
build the family to prepare for elections. It would be dangerous to be governed by 
someone from outside the family’ (HRW 2002: 3). People were afraid that if they did not 
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join, they would be labelled as subversives, as supporters of ‘divisionist’ parties, or as 
those who refuse to ‘build the country together’ (ibid.). People are pressured in a more 
indirect way too: 
 
At the local level, the authorities were going from house to house handing out forms … [asking 
for] name, and then there was a question ‘When did you join the umuryango?’ What do you 
mean? I joined my family when I was born [laughing]… no, the political umuryango, they meant 
ishaka by it, the party. It is called umuryango because it should be a ‘family for everyone’ … You 
see, it is a demagogic approach. It is tricky, because they ask them [the people they visit] ‘Why 
don’t you participate in government programmes?’ What do you mean, but this is not national 
programme, this is RPF!21 
 
Membership in the ‘political family’ literally comes with a price. Rwanda is not only a 
new land of fines, it is a land of ‘exactions’ couched in the language of ‘contributions’ 
(umusanzu). Raising money and other resources (such as labour) in the community is a 
changing but ancient practice, and is done on small scale everywhere. However, the 
notion of ‘contribution’ in Rwanda has been hijacked by the state and transformed into 
multiple exactions such as umuganda contributions (in form of labour), or icyunamo 
(mourning period) contributions (in form of cash). While non-state organisations such as 
churches also have their exactions,22 these are more than overshadowed by the diverse 
demands of the state. The ‘unity and reconciliation’ activities are also couched in the 
language of umusanzu, whereby ‘chaque doit donner sa contribution’23 (everyone should 
make their contribution). 
The RPF structure is unquestionably the most widespread and effective fundraising 
mechanism in Rwanda. It is a gutwerera writ large. Gutwerera is the process of raising 
money from family, friends and the wider community (including co-workers) to pay for a 
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wedding, the financing of which is seen not as a ‘private’ but ‘community’ responsibility. 
If the RPF is the umuryango, then elections are the perfect occasion for the political 
gutwerera. Trying to explain the intricate reach of the party, an informant tells me that 
‘all they [RPF] need is money’:  
 
For parliamentary elections, every government employee, or let’s say RPF member, was forced to 
contribute a third of his salary. If you don’t have a job, [there is] still something to contribute, 
they fix a minimum contribution. For next year [2010], each employee who is a member of the 
RPF will contribute half of their salary, that is 125,000 RwF [$US 220]. But every month I also 
contribute 5,000 RwF to the party, that means every year the contribution to the party is 60,000 
RwF.24  
 
The lateral structure: multiple responsibilities and indirect control 
But there is more to the ‘dense’ administrative apparatus. First, the state achieves control 
of the whole machinery through cooptation of multiple people into its ‘responsibilities’.  
 
The whole thing is copied from Mao Tse Tung. In my umudugudu, there are 235 families, 3 
people in charge of mutuelle de santé, 5 on official committee, 3 in community policing, 3 in 
gender based violence committee, 5 in imihigo committee, I am one of them, 5 education officers, 
there is also hygiene people responsible for that …. there is a minimum of 50 people responsible 
for something. This is a way of ensuring …you can’t have any ‘opening’, [space for] opposition 
there. In Tung’s China, the idea was to have two thirds of people busy with different 
responsibilities.25 
 
At the cell level, responsibilities multiply further: there are youth representatives, 
ubudehe committees [referring to ‘tradition’ of ‘mutual assistance’], and more. ‘But was 
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not this administrative structure there before?’ ‘It was there, but we didn’t have all those 
small committees, commissions … that makes it effective and efficient.’ Indeed, 
responsibilities as well as activities have exploded in the past decade. Institutions such as 
imihigo performance contracts, ubudehe ‘self-help’ committees, itorero schools 
(described as ‘advanced ingando’) and their administrative structures being recently 
added to the mix.  
To ‘cooptation through responsibility’ should be added the system of lateral (as 
opposed to simply hierarchical or vertical) controls, whereby there is an ‘eye on 
everybody’. The itorero school graduates, along with local teachers, for example, are part 
of a ‘consultative group’ at the cell level. Itoreros and teachers both have ‘their own 
identity, their structures, their priorities on which they are required to report’, but they 
also ‘advise the executive committee’. They have ‘legal power to give ideas to the cell, 
and to be an eye on the executive secretary for example’.26  
At the Muhazi ingando camp for child ex-combatants, the administrator has 
established a complex indirect system of rule, a society apart from society, where he is 
the sovereign. His pupils discipline themselves through a carefully constructed political 
governance system, which includes a leader (duvaye) and a disciplinarian as well as a 
‘gacaca’ court to resolve disputes. The children are separated into ‘sectors’ with rotating 
duties. Most importantly, ‘everybody has an eye on his fellow … even the leader is 
looking [at] gacaca; gacaca is watching the leader, everyone is watching their fellow.’27  
As this makes clear, the state system creates indirect control through widespread and 
locally embedded webs of administration, and through cooptation of multiple people into 
its ranks. To break possible dissent and mobilisation, the system offers a number of the 
dispossessed and disempowered just a little authority over the rest. But it is really the 
SURVEILLANCE AND STATE REACH IN RWANDA 
 
 
13 
acceptance (even if unwilling) of the ‘role’ that transforms, not necessarily the possession 
of more power.  
 
Imihigo performance contracts: incorporating family and individual into the state 
structure 
The recently introduced imihigo contracts also reflect the increasing permeation of 
people’s lives by the state. Imihigo were introduced in 2006 by MINALOC and, like 
many other activities before and since, have been presented as a restored ‘tradition’, 
specifically as ‘a long-standing cultural practice’ of accountability where two parties 
agree to work towards a stated goal (see e.g. ERD 2009; McConnell 2009; MINALOC 
2010). Though there has been no in-depth analysis of this process or its wider political 
effects, imihigo received wide acclaim: ‘formidable measure of accountability’, ‘valuable 
example to other countries in Africa struggling to implement a truly decentralised 
approach’ (McConnell 2009: 14; see also ERD 2009: 96). This is worrisome because, on 
close analysis, imihigo lead to deeper permeation of society by the state; and represent 
openings for increased coercion. 
Imihigo today are annual public pledges of performance, official contracts at different 
levels stating what that particular administrative unit will achieve and how that fits into 
the broader development agenda of the state (‘Vision 2020,’ MINECOFIN 2000). 
Imihigos started at the district level, but in 2007 were extended to all lower administrative 
levels. At district level, imihigos are signed by the mayors in front of the president 
himself. In 2008, Imihigo was extended to the family level: each family head signs their 
own imihigo. The plan for 2009 was to extend the imihigo practice to every individual 
(PMO 2009: 6). ‘What do family heads promise to achieve?’ ‘For example, send all kids 
to school, assure that everyone has a health insurance, that all join some kind of 
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cooperative, all fight corruption.’28 Imihigo appears to be a very localised public pledge 
of compliance with national policies. 
But imihigo not only permeates the social structure vertically, but is meant to do so 
horizontally as well. Groups of itorero graduates formulate their own imihigos. Some 
NGOs decide to speak of their annual achievement goals in the same language, such as 
the Rwandan Red Cross (see Wynter 2009). Religious leaders too ‘have resolved to adopt 
performance contracts. … Their contracts will highlight, among other things, 
interventions in matters of health insurance and fight against genocide ideology’ (NTK 
24.6.2008). Most recently, an article published by the NTK (Asiimwe 2009) suggests that 
private businesses should sign Imihigo: 
  
We should be looking at how to stretch these performance contracts across all boundaries. They 
should not only be a thing for the public sector. It could take the form of private, public 
partnership. For example, MTN, Rwandatel and TIGO could sign annual imihigo with the 
regulatory agency. Private newspapers, radios and television stations could do the same. Private 
Sector Federation could cluster different businesses and sign performance contracts with 
members of each cluster. 
 
Every three months, there is an imihigo evaluation. At the end of the stated period, 
reports detailing achievements are prepared at all levels. The district mayors attend a 
televised event called ‘kuvuga ibigwi’ or ‘kurata imihigo’ (MINALOC 2008), presided 
over by the president, where they present their performance reports and exemplary 
performance on imihigo is acknowledged. There are also consultations in which ‘people 
debate why [they] have not finished and accomplished all goals and what have been the 
obstacles [they] encountered’ (ibid). 
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What are the effects of Imihigo? First, through Imihigo, families are effectively 
incorporated into the administrative hierarchy, and come to form its ‘smallest 
administrative unit’ (NTK 10.11.2008). Effectively though, all individuals are meant to 
make their ‘contribution’. Second, imihigo is a top-down mechanism of control. It not 
only further strengthens surveillance, but is also a mechanism for measuring alignment 
with government policies. Local authorities have to ‘guide’ residents not only to 
‘embrace’ the idea of imihigo (ibid.), but also to embrace the policies that are promoted 
through it (such as 100% enrolment in mutuelle de santé scheme), and the labour that 
leads to achievement of some of the goals.  
The pressure to achieve goals can result in coercion. ‘If [imihigo] targets are not met, 
district authorities can expect their careers to be negatively affected. Not surprisingly 
therefore, local authorities use measures such as fines and destruction of property to 
ensure targets are met’ (Huggins 2009: 299). Another report states that ‘households that 
failed to meet their performance targets were fined and could be imprisoned for non-
payment at local detention centres called cachots’ (Thomson 2008: 8). ‘In an independent 
survey commissioned by the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and 
Southern Africa (OSSREA) from mid-2007, more than half of the respondents confirmed 
some form of compulsion had been used to achieve the imihigo targets’ (Huggins 2009: 
299). 
In this context, achievement of a target, whether in form of a quantity or a deadline, 
becomes more important than quality of output: the imihigo for gacaca at district and 
sector levels was that it would finish by 2007. ‘Such a target’, suggests a PRI report 
(2007: 6), ‘runs in the face of serenity and fairness of the hearing as the courts are under 
pressure and cannot examine the cases before them in detail.’ The proof comes from 
reading a select ‘raporo y’imihigo’ (imihigo report). The Ngoma district (2009) report on 
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2008 achievements presents figures without any sources, and yet what it does include and 
how is telling. The report focuses on ‘adherence’ to state policies (umuganda 
participation, enrolment in mutuelle de santé), state ‘extraction’ (taxes collected) and 
‘production’ (TIG29 labour value). Participation at umuganda (at 73%) is included under 
‘good governance’. The only input under ‘justice’ is the monetised value of TIG labour.  
In addition, rather than promoting local priorities as it claims, imihigo assures 
mainstreaming at all levels into the national development plan. ‘I thought it [imihigo] was 
a way to improve the coherence of the planning process, national and local interests, but 
within the first months it became clear that government promoted the national, not the 
local priorities.’30 While my informant agreed that the activity does promote ‘some kind 
of local decision-making’, often what results is a plan to please the centre: ‘The mayor on 
his own is able to raise 20%, maybe 30% of his budget, the rest comes from the 
ministries, so of course he thinks “I will look at the priorities [of ministries], and will 
persuade my people these are their own priorities”’.31  
 
Decentralisation: dispatching of control? 
Based on above, it appears the state system effectively ‘dispatches’ rather than 
‘decentralises’ control. The latter would suggest that the centre loses some of its hold, but 
what we witness is not devolution of power to conceive and decide, just the devolution of 
implementation. Sprawling administration, multiple responsibilities and imihigo, in the 
final balance, do not point to decentralisation of power, but rather to dispatching of power 
through which, sure enough, control becomes more effective and compliance increases.  
The effects are the exact opposite to the discourse: not only has ‘decentralisation’ not 
led to democratisation, but it has also directly strengthened authoritarian rule. This brings 
to mind Habyarimana’s aim to transform the communes into ‘motors of development’ 
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(Uvin 1998: 24). The attempt meant that ‘after years of work, communal development 
projects served to allow the burgomestres to better control their population’ (’ (Voyame 
et al. 1996, 1999, in Uvin 1998: 25 discussing the findings of Voyame et al.). 
A former employee on the decentralisation project The former National Coordinator 
for Decentralisation supports the above verdicts:  
 
The World Bank has claimed that we have better performance on this [decentralisation] than 
other African countries … But despite this talk and despite this attempt [the official process of 
decentralisation], the majority of decisions concerning the lives of the people come from the 
centre. Decentralisation has not transferred authority to local levels of government. [Rather], it is 
a way of management of the country, having structures to transmit information more directly to 
the people, for them to understand what the government wants. Kagame himself said this in a 
meeting.32 
 
During meetings at the ministry, my informant the coordinator supposedly raised the 
point of lower administrative levels adopting the priorities of the centre:  
 
When I had these comments, the minister liked to talk of ‘unicity’ – ‘The state is one [he would 
say], why do you differentiate the national and the local?’ I said it should be the electorate, the 
people [who defines priorities] … When it became apparent that I had ideas that contradict my 
own minister, I left in 2007, I resigned. I said it was for family reasons, health reasons. So 
[please] do not tell them the truth! [laughter].33 
 
 
INFORMATION APPARATUS 
 
Formatted: Font: Italic
Commented [AP1]: For security of this informant, I would 
actually like to make this more ambiguous, hence former 
employee on the decentralization project. 
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The administrative and information systems are interdependent, but do not completely 
overlap. The system of spreading, getting, and blocking information is even more 
widespread, and to a large extent informal. The flows of information lead from top down 
as well as the other way. The top-down flow of the everpresent ‘sensitisation’, 
‘mobilisation’, education and re-education will not be studied here. Suffice it to say that 
for this flow, the administrative system proves a highly useful ‘irrigation’ scheme. The 
focus here is instead on the bottom-up system of information gathering.  
The state dispatches control not only by creating a widespread network of indirect 
rule, but also through its network of ‘eyes and ears’ that is much more ‘present’ on a 
daily basis. Both public and some private interaction are monitored. ‘There are some 
reports that the government monitored homes and telephone calls’ (US DOS 2008: 10). 
During the November 2008 state-organised protests, MTN sent everyone the same 
messages in Kinyarwanda, urging people to gather at specific places and times. The US 
government has also allegedly sold Rwanda an email tracking system, which has been 
misused by the government to check on its critics/opponents and other ‘suspicious’ 
individuals (source?).  
Regarding informers (i.e. authorities’ spies), ‘they are almost everywhere. [They] 
work closely with the police, intelligence and the army. [They] are recruited mainly from 
the youth, [they are] trained in Akagera Park, between 6 and 12 months. Some state 
employees at district, cell level [have been trained]. Once they approached me and tried 
to convince me but I refused. [Those that approach you] promise you will get a job, and 
they do [indeed] get appointed first.’34 People suggest there is a spy per organisation and 
perhaps per office, and in fact that all newcomers (to an organisation), foreigners and 
Hutu are given someone to ‘watch’ them. ‘[There is] so many staff in government who 
are not paid for what they have in job description, but for intelligence. The guy next to 
Commented [AP3]: I have just one informal source; it is 
hard to ‘prove’ this allegation, especially with regard to the 
US; though I believe the RW government does surveil 
internet communication.  
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me … if you are a Hutu, it is compulsory, you are given someone to watch you. In many 
places, [there are] people who do not talk, because every word you say is analysed by 
those guys.’35 The Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Presidential 
Protection Unit (PPU) seem to be involved in their own tracking, and are said to possess 
lists of people to be ‘watched’ and potentially targeted.  
Surveillance is present not only inside organisations and government administration, 
but at the lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy, where those responsible after all 
‘know the people’, and where the two compulsory daily district reports on security source 
their material. Besides the administrative apparatus, the policing apparatus is also key. 
The latest addition to the police, irindos (civilian night patrols) and Local Defence Forces 
(LDF) is the so-called ‘community police’. What is the function of yet another ‘police’ 
body? Community police are officially selected by people, they carry no gun and are not 
paid. People referred to them as ‘plain clothes police’, or as not really policemen but 
simply ‘party cadres’ selected by the party leadership. ‘Community policing is about 
information. Other countries do not have this system but we do because of the past of 
genocide. It is to prevent crimes before they happen. You don’t want to arrive when 
somebody is already killed; you want to know about the plan before. People are chosen 
by others in the community on the basis of their integrity and that they like to talk, that 
they are not silent…There are about 10 community police per 150 people say, so you 
have people in all corners.’36 
Informers are indeed believed to be everywhere, and many people can simply be used 
for that purpose when and as necessary. To trace teachers harbouring divisionist 
ideologies, ‘well, there are the students, they know and say what the teachers are 
teaching, [for example] with regards to history, what kind of examples they are using’. 
‘Problematic’ individuals can be traced in bars and restaurants because ‘even waiters, 
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they can be intelligence.’37 The way in which surveillance happens is described in detail 
by Begley (2009: 4) who, during her field research on the contribution of Rwandan 
Muslims to the reconciliation process, found out from one of her informants that ‘not just 
one, but five different men have been following our movements’. This included ‘the 
waiter from the restaurant [who] hired a couple of street kids to follow us [and who in 
turn] reported to another man on the street who then contacted the Chairman of the RPF’. 
It is difficult to know exactly who represents the ‘ears and eyes’ of higher authorities, 
and who is merely curious, a gossip, or generally suspecting, or whether those who 
observe from a distance actually understand anything being said and whether they pass it 
on. The perception nonetheless remains that surveillance and locally traced intelligence 
are ubiquitous, and the effects of this on behaviour are very real. Every researcher in 
Rwanda either experiences or hears stories of surveillance and notices the resulting self-
editing behaviour. It is certainly true that neither email nor phone or even certain 
occasions at home are considered safe for discussing political or otherwise ‘sensitive’ 
issues. One informant told me that ‘no one really talks on the phone anymore, just the 
basics and that is it. You only start commenting on something and people stop you.’38 
 
 
THE SPECTRUM OF STATE-LED ACTIVITIES 
 
While the administrative and information systems describe the general physical 
‘presence’ of the state and its penetration of people’s lives for the purpose of extracting 
loyalties, contributions (monetary and non-monetary), information and specific conduct, 
this section looks at that aspect of state presence that may be called ‘saturation’ of 
people’s time with multiple state-ordained activities. First, it shows that the difficulty of 
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taxation in subsistence economies can be and is resolved by introduction of alternative 
but no less potent forms of non-monetary taxation. Second, actual tax has two 
components: production for state (labour), and non-production due to state (opportunity 
cost of time spent on all state-designed activities). Though this requires a much broader 
analysis than what can be offered here (How much exaction is acceptable and in fact 
economically viable?), it is important to think of the activities in today’s Rwanda in this 
way – in lieu of finances (though monetary exactions are there also), people’s time and 
energy are appropriated in the production of public goods (the effectiveness of which 
may be disputed due to evasion, perfunctory effort or lack of necessary skill).  
The intricate administrative and information networks together with the imbrications 
of the party at every level harness the ability of the Rwandan state to ‘mobilise’ bodies to 
a political effect, or to disperse them with the aim of preventing political expression. The 
ability of the state to mobilise its citizens is shown perfectly in the example of the state-
organised protests in late 2008. In response to the arrest of Rose Kabuye in Germany, the 
government organised people from the cell level up. To this end, they used state 
administrative officials and text messaging. The result was a flood of people organised in 
their cell units and merging in the centre, clogging Kigali streets with their banners, 
slogans and songs. But in the north39 too (and apparently across the whole country) 
people were gathered at sector level, either sitting on clearings in front of the 
administrative offices and listening to officials’ speeches, or marching (rain or no rain) on 
parts of the Kigali-Ruhengeri road.  
Effective ‘dispersion’ of bodies, on the other hand, was demonstrated not too long 
after, during the refugee protests40 in Kiziba and Gihembe camps. Protests started inIn 
January 2009 when, on hearing that the leader of the CNDP- Laurent Nkunda- (‘protector 
of Congolese Tutsi’) was arrested by Rwandan agents. The, refugees in Rwanda (mainly 
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Congolese Tutsi) were angered and staged demonstrations because they saw Nkunda as 
the ‘protector’ of the Congolese Tutsi population, a figure thatwho were was in fact 
supporteding by the Rwandan government up to this pointhim.  all alonThe protests 
consisted of g, the refugees within Rwanda staged demonstrations. ‘It was hundreds of 
refugees pretty much just marching around their own camp.’ 41 However, ‘the 
government thought that it could get out of hand or turn violent, so they entered and 
sought measures to quell the situation. This included no refugees being allowed in or out 
of the camp until the situation was normalised ... Refugees were encouraged ... to refrain 
from any further demonstrations or protests and that's where it stands now.’42 
Due to the effectiveness of physical mobilisation, people not only have to but actually 
do participate in a myriad of activities, some of which are periodic and others ad-hoc. 
First, there are multiple unpaid administrative and policing duties (e.g. the local night 
patrols composed of village members). Second, there are general activities, which are 
costly in terms of time (as opposed to labour). Meetings happen both periodically (such 
as mandatory weekly security meetings) and on special occasions (e.g. on ‘Hero’s Day’, 
before elections), during commemoration (e.g. the annual official ceremonies and related 
activities) or for ‘political happenings’ (state protests, local RPF meetings). The gacaca is 
convened once a week, which can require extra sessions if a particularly complicated case 
is being heard. 
Third, there are the most clearly labour-exacting duties. The last Saturday of every 
month is devoted to umuganda or ‘community work’. Umuganda lasts from about eight 
in the morning until the early afternoon and is followed by a meeting. But ‘voluntary’ 
community work does not really have a clear limit. Local leaders have leeway in trying to 
enforce extra work, especially in the countryside, where ‘surprise umugandas’ are not 
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uncommon.43 ‘It is in Kigali that there is only one day of umuganda. So many districts 
have even two times.’44  
Work and meetings are also required as part of the ubudehe scheme. In ubudehe, cells 
receive small funds (usually about US$1000) that they complement with their own 
resources (normally labour), to carry out locally designed projects such as upgrading or 
formation of anti-erosion terraces, upgrading or construction of roads, construction of 
schools, etc. Umuganda and especially ubudehe, where costs are ‘matched’ by provision 
of labour for what are often public infrastructure projects,45 show perhaps most clearly 
the indirect but effective (in terms of mass targeting and capture) taxing of people in 
Rwanda.  
In addition to this, increasing numbers of people undergo itorero training (similar to 
ingando camps), which involves participation in public works (e.g. construction of a 
road). Itorero graduates draw up group imihigos that they pledge to fulfil, which usually 
means offerings of further free labour for a variety of projects. The pressure to fulfil 
sector or district imihigo goals translates into local authorities’ ever greater (ab)use of 
people’s labour. There is also pressure to be an agasozi ndatwa (‘example hill’) and 
indasikirwa (‘the best of the best’).46 ‘Because [the leaders] want this [these awards], they 
impose some kind of meetings and work every week, even two times a week.’47 
The result is that ‘the poor do not have time’.48 Due to varied exactions and insertions 
of the state, ‘people are not doing what they should be doing [farming]. An agronomist 
[farmer], on Monday he had to go to see if the gacaca will continue, Tuesday was the 
RPF meeting, then other day some other meetings, plus all the social obligations.’49 
Genocide survivors and women with male relatives in prisons or TIG camps are perhaps 
affected the most. The latter not only lack the extra labour force and have to divide their 
time between field, children and state activities, but have the added responsibility of 
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trekking to prisons, bringing their husbands, brothers, or fathers food and other basic 
necessities. At the National University of Rwanda (NUR) in Butare, one girl answered 
my question on the most pressing social problems in Rwanda in the following way: 
‘Poverty is increasing, especially in the countryside. These days there are a lot of 
government programmes from umuganda, gacaca, ubudehe … umuganda and gacaca, 
there is no benefit, ubudehe at least it brings something to the person … Tuesday is 
gacaca, Saturday umuganda, Thursday gacaca … 3 out of 6 days [there is something] 
because Sunday does not count … Plus a lot of meetings. Today at night we have a 
meeting with the executive secretary of umurenge, you cannot resist [refuse to go], 
otherwise you go to prison … [There are a] lot of government programmes these days.’50  
The manner in which the government ‘makes’ people comply with different types of 
exactions from conduct to labour, how and to what extent people try and manage to evade 
them, and what type of participation and production actually results, are important 
considerations that require a separate analysis. For now, let us merely note that the state is 
‘overbearing’ in both its penetration and extraction. Multiple activities exist that make 
their claim on people’s resources. The extent is such that public goods and programmes 
take precedence over private welfare of subsistence farmers. The attention to the former 
may already be at the cost of the latter, in terms of relative inattention to private 
production on farms, with rural impoverishment as a result.  
Lastly, rural areas may be disproportionately affected: there is greater surveillance and 
enforcement. ‘Not many people go to umuganda here in the city, but in the countryside, 
eh, can you dare not to go even once? You are fined!’51 There is also  less need to build 
basic infrastructure in the cities, and it is costly to transport city dwellers to work on rural 
projects, though terrace upgrading and ditch digging are not uncommon during 
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umuganda. Office work also dictates that in cities all state activities happen during the 
weekends and after work.52  
 
 
WHAT COUNTER-WEIGHTS TO THE STATE? 
  
At this point, there are two questions of interest: What is ‘non-state’? What is a ‘bulwark’ 
to the current penetrating party-state? The reason why it makes sense to ask the above 
questions in Rwanda is that the intricate and penetrating state system has been wholly 
(and increasingly) captured by a specific party with an ideology that aims no less than to 
transform the society from above. In this goal, the state aims at ‘totality’ of influence. 
The state’s aspiration is not to annihilate non-state organised life (church sermons, self-
help groups, lunch discussions), but rather to have a degree of control and influence over 
all of these forms.  
Importantly, this is not an attempt to discuss  ‘civil society’, an ambiguous, highly 
Europe-indigenous term (Mbembe 2001; Uvin 1998). Even if we adopt a clear proxy, 
associational density, we find that in Rwanda ‘dense associational fabric’ did not prevent 
fast disintegration of society in genocide (Uvin 1998: 163-79), and on the other hand 
clearly proved an ineffective bulwark against the extreme asset that the state proved to be. 
This is because the mere existence of NGOs and other formal or informal groupings does 
not highlight how government fundamentally moulds these, by attacking them for 
perceived dissention, or urging them to cooperate in the work of the state.  
With regard to suppression of the non-state, the Rwandan government operates 
multiple strategies of curbing opposition and managing dissent. The result is a well-
documented and general restriction on ‘groupness’53 (e.g. political parties, media outlets, 
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but also cultural and human rights organisations that can be and have been attacked as 
‘divisionist’). With regard to cooperation with the state, imihigo contracts are perhaps the 
best formal demonstration of this phenomenon. They are applied both horizontally and 
vertically, targeting all possible non-state spheres including the family and the private 
sector.54 
 ‘Opposition’, ‘dissent’, or simply ‘unofficial scripts’ from which alternative 
groupness might arise, certainly do exist in their many shades. There are also bulwarks 
that are more institutionalised or organised than mere ‘critique’, ‘apathy’ or ‘avoidance’. 
In a semi-organised but underground form, a bulwark against the state exists in the Hutu 
‘conspiracy of silence’ in gacaca (Rettig 2008). In addition, personal networks offer a 
fluid and informal bulwark against the state. People of mixed background, whose 
affiliations cross ethnicities, are a good example of this phenomenon. While their 
background exposes them to distrust and even government persecution, they may at the 
same time get potentially life-saving information on time from an old acquaintance 
within the RPF establishment.55 
Despite these and other dynamics that can ‘undo’ the state, the increasing permeation 
of the state into all aspects of life reflects the preoccupation with assuring alignment. As a 
result of this dynamic, neither religious organisations, schools, nor associations or even 
private sector and the family escape the state’s reach.  Some of these certainly constitute 
an alternative source of authority, attention and ideology, but they cannot openly oppose 
and often are urged to align with and assist the state.  
 
                     
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The state’s reach in today’s Rwanda is not only deep and manifold with little counter-
weight, but directly leads to more effective political control. Through its presence and 
indirect control, a state of surveillance is created. This diminishes open dissent and 
tightens the reproduction and reproducibility of the official script. The system not only 
creates strong governmentality due to its ‘reach’ – the intimate contact, the 
responsiveness, its readability of the social ‘scape’. It governs through its accompanying 
effects as well. Suspicion, distrust (strongly compounded by genocide), fear and the 
resultant decreased dissent all assure that the state is better able to gather and disperse, to 
stage and broadcast, to extract resources and attempt its desired transformations.  
Overall, this article urges a more critical scrutiny of ‘local’ ‘participation’ in 
‘traditional activities’, of their actual meaning in the context of strong hierarchies of 
authority and a highly centralised political system, which has at its disposal a dense state 
apparatus. One important lesson that arises from the analysis is that ‘grassroots’ does not 
always mean ‘free of central power’, that ‘local’ activities bringing together scores of 
people do not mean power has been ‘decentralised’, that people have a greater stake in, 
‘say’ or power over their lives, or that the most pressing issues are openly discussed. 
Despotism can also be decentralised (Mamdani 1996), and so can disempowerment.    
 
                                                        
NOTES 
 
1. MTN is a key mobile phone provider recognisable by its ubiquitous yellow logo. Personal 
communication with a researcher friend, 7.5.2010. 
2. Historically, the abundance of land on this continent (Herbst 2000; Reid 2009) made state 
consolidation a question of control over populations (through construction of loyalties, use of coercion, 
creation of infrastructure), rather than territories. 
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3. Until 2002, Rwanda was divided into prefectures, which were divided into communes. In 2002, the 
structure changed to what it is today, with some exceptions: i) there used to be more provinces;  ii) an 
additional administrative level of umujyi (municipality) was inserted between district and sector levels; and 
iii) the lowest administrative level was that of the nyumba kumi, non-salaried representatives responsible 
for 10 households, including their own. In 2006, Rwanda revised its administrative structure, reducing the 
number of provinces from 12 to 5, abolishing the umujyi and, officially, the nuymba kumi. 
4. Umusozi (the hill), in the kingdom, was the basic socio-political unit, usually divided into several 
neighbourhoods. In each neighbourhood, one family head was used as its head by the hill chief, and was 
called umukoresha. 
5. The description draws on numerous visits to my own sector offices but also those of other Kigali 
sectors and observation of various local administrative offices within and outside Kigali. 
6.  Umuyobozi refers to an official, ‘a head of’, a leader. 
7. The area where I lived was still referred to as Nyamirambo, but in fact fell under the Nyakabanda 
sector administration. Within the sector, ‘Nyakabanda ambere’ was my cell. 
8. Interview with a Rwandan researcher, former civil servant, 25.2.2009 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Informal discussion with an anthropologist who, by the time we met, had conducted more than one 
year of fieldwork research on gacaca, 4.4.2009. 
12. Informal chat with a National Curriculum Development Centre employee, Kigali, 30.3.2009. 
13. MINALOC website:.  <http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/>  please add URL   
14. Interview with a Rwandan researcher, former civil servant, 25.2.2009 
15. Abakangurambaga are literally ‘people who wake up the masses’; they act as ‘promoters’ or liaisons. 
Interestingly, abakangurambaga – highlighted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
(NURC) as one of the local and traditional ‘unity and reconciliation resources’ – are directly part of the 
bureaucracy of the state. They used to be part of state structures even before 1994, when they were known 
as animateurs. 
16. Interview with a civil servant, 22.2.2009. 
17. It is unclear how exactly this process works; i.e. to what extent is the election only a confirmation of 
pre-selected candidates. 
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18. Interview with a civil servant, 18.3.2009.  
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Interview with a researcher and former civil servant, 6.4.2009.  
22. For example, when the employed and ‘able’ in the congregation are called forth to contribute their 
‘one tenth’ in a sealed envelope. Visit to a local church in Kimisagara, 9.11.2008. 
23. Interview with an employee in the Ombudsman’s Office, 14.1.2009. 
24. Interview with a civil servant, 18.3.2009.  
25. Interview with researcher and former civil servant, 6.4.2009. 
26. Interview with Professional for Good Governance at a Rwandan ministry, 12.3.2009. 
27. Visit to the Muhazi ingando camp for youth ex-combatants, 28.1.2009.  
28. Informal chat with a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) employee, Nyanza, 
17.11.2008. 
29. Released prisoners are often sentenced by the gacaca to some years in labour camps called ‘TIG’ 
(Travaux d’Intérêt Général or community work). 
30. Interview with a researcher who worked for the relevant ministry during imihigo inception, 
21.1.2009. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Interview held at a research institute, 21.1.2009. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Interview with a civil servant, 18.3.2009. 
35. Ibid.  
36. Interview with an ingando camp coordinator, loc.cit. 
37. Interview with a civil servant, 22.2.2009. 
38. Interview with a Rwandan researcher and former civil servant, 6.4.2009. 
39. On 19.11.2008, when the protests reached their peak, I was travelling with NURC’s Director of Civic 
Education to Ruhengeri. 
40. The only spontaneous protests that do happen in Rwanda seem to occur in the refugee camps. 
41. Private email communication between the Reuters Rwanda correspondent and his superiors in the 
UK, forwarded to me by the correspondent on 28.1.2009. 
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42. Ibid. 
43. Informal chat with an anthropologist who conducted long-term fieldwork in communities around 
Butare a couple of years before. 
44. Interview with a Rwandan researcher, 25.2.2009. 
45. Interview with the ubudehe coordinator at a government ministry, 30.1.2009. 
46. Best among administrative levels such as districts but also among individuals. 
47. Interview with a ministry employee/civil servant, 1.1.2009. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. National University of Rwanda (NUR) campus, Butare, 5.2.2009. 
51. Interview with a civil servant, 22.2.2009 
52. A couple of important specifications: First, the Saturday umuganda may affect sales of small and big 
businesses as the one rule that remains well-enforced is that all shops must be closed. The same holds for 
other meetings, gatherings, official protests, etc. Second, private sector and public offices may close early 
due to state-organised activities (e.g. official protests at Kabuye’s arrest).  
53. ‘Groupness’ (Brubaker 2004) is the ability and degree to which a collectivity can assume a corporate 
dimension, be effectively communicating, mutually interacting, and acting on its corporate goals.  
54. People question whether there is a ‘private’ sector at all. Most lucrative businesses are said to belong 
de facto to the party (are controlled by it) (see Willum 2001: 115), and the private sector federation 
chairman is a political appointee. 
55. This repeatedly occurred in a US asylum case (of a Rwandan national) I worked on in 2009. 
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